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ABSTRACT - In this paper we study the diffusion of modern irrigation technologies among a 
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network and imitation effects. The major contribution of our work is to extend the traditional 
(theoretical) model of diffusion to account for production risk and the value of information 
about the new technology. This model is then applied to a sample of 385 farms located in 
Crete, Greece, to describe diffusion of modern irrigation technologies. Our results indicate 
that risk aversion plays a significant role and that farmers who are more sensitive to the risk of 
extreme events will adopt the modern irrigation technology earlier. Knowledge, experience 
and information dissemination are found to reduce time before adoption of the new 
technology, while farmers tend to learn more from and/or imitate farmers that are homophylic 
to them with respect to their education level, age and farm specialization.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Adoption of advanced irrigation technologies has been the major contributor to the reduction 
in irrigation water use in many regions and countries suffering from water scarcity. Therefore, 
understanding the determinants of irrigation technology investment and adoption rates is 
necessary for the design of agri-environmental policies towards sustainable water use. It is 
important for farmers, manufacturers of irrigation equipment, and regulators to understand the 
conditions under which a specific technology (i.e., drip, sprinklers) is desirable and likely to 
be adopted as well as the factors that affect its diffusion process. Analyzing adoption and 
diffusion patterns of irrigation technologies have been at the core of several empirical studies 
including those by Caswell and Zilberman (1985), Dinar and Zilberman, Dinar, Campbell and 
Zilberman, Dinar and Yaron, Dridi and Khanna and, Koundouri, Nauges and Tzouvelekas. In 
contrast with the epidemic models of diffusion initiated by Griliches and Mansfield, this body 
of the literature argues that adoption and diffusion patterns are the result of explicit 
maximizing behaviour of a population of heterogeneous farmers. In most cases, economic 
factors (water price, cost of irrigation equipment, crop prices, etc.) but also farm 
organizational characteristics and environmental conditions, do matter to explain adoption and 
diffusion of modern irrigation technologies.   
However, in the case of long-lasting technologies like modern irrigation infrastructure, 
farmers are faced with a decision which is costly to reverse and requires appropriate future 
planning. These investments change both variable and fixed costs, often require equity or debt 
financing, may alter the scale of production and can require more intensive on-farm 
management to ensure positive economic returns.1 Sahal and Thirtle and Ruttan, summarizing 
the diffusion literature, argue that the epidemic models of diffusion mistakenly ignore the 
multidimensional process reflected in aggregate adoption rates. Individual farmers may 
exhibit different patterns of adoption through time due to: (i) the existing information set and 
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their capacity to absorb and process that information, (ii) their risk preferences and 
perceptions - farmers may be willing to adopt irrigation technologies in order to hedge against 
risk during years of water shortage, as the same farm output can be sustained with less 
irrigation water-, (iii) the degree of technical compatibility between the innovation and farm’s 
existing production technology, (iv) factors exogenous to the farm such as market conditions, 
government policy and the general economic environment.2  
Along these lines, and using the theoretical underpinnings of technology adoption 
suggested by Dinar, Campbell and Zilberman and Caswell and Zilberman (1986), we extend 
the theoretical model developed by Koundouri, Nauges and Tzouvelekas, describing adoption 
of modern irrigation technology. More precisely, we model the process of technology 
diffusion accounting for production risk and the value of information about the new 
technology. The empirical application is made on a sample of 385 farms located in the island 
of Crete, Greece, and surveyed during the 2005-06 cropping period. Information on the exact 
time of adoption of drip irrigation technologies allows us to study factors affecting the length 
of time to adoption using a duration model. Duration analysis allows investigation of the 
timing of technology adoption, by modeling the conditional probability of adoption at a 
particular time period, given that adoption has not occurred before. In order to account for 
farmers’ risk preferences, we incorporate the first four sample moments of profit in the 
diffusion model, along the lines of Kim and Chavas, and Koundouri, Nauges and 
Tzouvelekas. Another contribution of this paper is to investigate (empirically) the role of 
network and imitation effects on technology diffusion among a population of heterogeneous 
farmers.  
 
In Section 2, we present the theoretical model of diffusion of modern irrigation 
technology under production risk and in section 3 we describe the corresponding econometric 
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model. In section 4, we discuss the data and the specification of the diffusion model and in 
section 5 we discuss the estimation results. In section 6 we conclude the paper. 
 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
Let’s assume that farms utilize a vector of conventional inputs  (e.g., land, capital, labor) 
together with irrigation water 
cx
wx  to produce a single output y through a technology described 
by a well-behaved (i.e., continuous and twice differentiable) production function satisfying all 
the regular neoclassical properties (i.e., positive and diminishing marginal productivities),  
 
   (1) ( wy f ,x ;d ,k= cx  )
 
where k is the irrigation technology index,3 d is an aridity index capturing weather 
conditions,4 and wx  is the amount of effective irrigation water applied to the plant. Following 
Caswell and Zilberman (1986) we define a measure of irrigation effectiveness ( ewx ) as the 
ratio of effective water ( wx ) to applied irrigation water ( wx ), i.e.,5   
 
e
w w wx x x=           (2) 
and 
e
w w wx x x= ⋅          (3) 
 
Irrigation effectiveness is influenced by three decisive factors (Dinar, Campbell, and 
Zilberman): the water holding capacity of the soil (q), the prevailing weather conditions (d), 
and the method of water application (k) (i.e., irrigation technology). Hence, relation (3) can be 
expressed as a general function of the form: 
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 ( )w wx g x ;q,d ,k=         (4) 
 
Higher soil’s water holding capacity is expected to increase irrigation water efficiency 
so the following relationships should hold: 0qg′ >  and 0qqg′′ ≤ .6 High precipitation increases 
soil moisture, and thus irrigation effectiveness, as less water is applied to the crop. High 
temperatures increase yield but at the same time also increase evaporation. This positive 
relationship holds up to a given point ( d ) which is unique to each field and/or plant. After 
that point a further increase in temperature reduces yield. Thus, we expect  and 0dg′ > 0ddg′′ ≤  
for d d≤  and  and  for 0dg′ < 0ddg′′ ≥ d d>
( )
. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that capital 
intensive irrigation technology enhances irrigation effectiveness, while it also affects the 
composition of input quantities used in crop production (e.g., fertilization through irrigation 
system). Hence, we assume that ( )0w ,q,d;k1 1w ,q,d;k 0g x g x>  with k=1, 0 being the modern 
and traditional irrigation technology, respectively.7 Modern irrigation technologies can be 
interpreted as land quality augmenting since they enhance soil’s water retention capacity. 
However, the gain in irrigation effectiveness associated with the change in irrigation 
technology is likely to decline with soil quality and increase with adverse weather conditions.  
Following Dinar, Campbell and Zilberman, farmer’s joint decision of an irrigation water 
application rate and irrigation technology assuming profit-maximizing behavior can be solved 
via a two-stage procedure. First, farmers choose the optimal amount of irrigation water 
together with conventional inputs for each technology (traditional and modern) and 
subsequently choose the irrigation technology yielding the highest profits. Obviously if none 
of the technologies yields positive profits, farmers will not operate at all. In addition, we 
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assume that farmers are not myopic in a sense that they can form expectations concerning all 
conjectures of their future profit flows.8 
Furthermore, since farm production is affected by weather conditions we assume that 
farmers incur production risk. This risk is commonly represented by a random variable , 
whose distribution is exogenous to farmer’s actions. Following Koundouri, Nauges and 
Tzouvelekas, this is the only source of risk we consider, as output and factor prices are 
assumed non-random (i.e., farmers are assumed to be price-takers in both the input and output 
markets).  
ε
Hence if farmers are risk-averse with irrigation technology k (k= 0, 1), the profit 
function is written as follows: 
 
k k k k
w wπ py w x c= − − −k' kc cw x k        (5) 
 
where  and ( )k kw y = f x , ;d ,k εkcx  ( )k kw wx = g x ;q,d ,k ,  is the fixed cost of production 
associated with the given state of irrigation technology 
kc
( )0 1k ,= ; p is the output price which 
is known to farmers with certainty;9 ++∈ℜkcw  is the vector of strictly positive conventional 
factor prices, and  is the unit cost of irrigation water.  kww
Farmers initially produce using a traditional irrigation technology (i.e., furrow), but 
they have the option to invest in a more efficient technology (i.e., drip). If they switch 
technologies, they must incur an irreversible investment cost, which may include the cost of 
designing a complete irrigation system and investing in the new infrastructure (e.g., pipes, 
filters, fertilization equipment) as well as the cost related with training both themselves and 
hired workers to use the new irrigation equipment. So, we assume that adoption of the new 
technology implies a change in the fixed cost of production,  (e.g., new fertilization 1c c> 0
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equipment) and might change the marginal cost of water ( )1 0w ww w≠
( )
.10 Adoption of modern 
irrigation technology is assumed to be irreversible, as it might not be easy to re-sale the 
equipment. These arguments imply that a positive value of additional information might exist 
(Jensen; Dixit and Pindyck). In other words, imperfect knowledge about the new irrigation 
technology can lead to a strategic incentive to delay adoption (Foster and Rosenzweig).  
If we assume that the cost of acquiring the new drip irrigation technology at time t is 
known to the farmers, and the adoption decision is a discrete choice, then each farmer 
maximizes expected profits and chooses the time of adoption, τ, which solves the following 
dynamic optimization problem (Kerr and Newell): 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )0 1
0
τ
ρt t rτ
τ τ
τ
max  ψ t max Ε U π t e dt E U π t e I τ e
∞
− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡= + ⎡⎣⎣ ⎦ ⎣∫ ∫ ρ dt  - C τ⎤⎦ −+ ⎤⎦  (6) 
 
where  are the total benefits obtained by farmers under both irrigation technologies, 
 is an increasing, concave and twice differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function,  is the cost of equipment for the new irrigation technology at the year of 
adoption,  represents the value of information also at the year of adoption, ρ is the risk-
adjusted discount rate since farm production is subject to weather risk, and r is the risk-free 
discount rate. Farmers will adopt at year τ the new irrigation technology if it is not more 
profitable to wait until a later period because of falling investment costs. The first-order 
condition of the maximization problem in (5), known as the arbitrage condition, implies: 
( )ψ t
C
(I
( )U ⋅
( )τ
)τ
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0τ′ ≥t τψ τ V τ r C τ Ι τ C τ Ι′ = − + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ′     (7) 
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where  are the expected gross benefits of adopting drip 
irrigation technology at time τ. The arbitrage condition is sufficient if the acquiring cost is 
non-increasing and convex, and the expected gross benefits of adoption are non-decreasing 
with respect to time. Specifically, the second-order sufficient condition implies that: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )(1V τ Ε U π τ Ε U π τ⎡ ⎤ ⎡= −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ )0 ⎤⎦
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0t t t tt ttψ t V t r C t I t C t I t′′ ′ ′ ′ ′′ ′′= − + + + ≥⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦     (8) 
 
Conditions (7) and (8) are likely to hold as water availability is decreasing over time and 
the technology-acquiring cost generally decreases at a decreasing rate over time, eventually 
reaching a constant level. Hence, the general pattern implied by relation (7) is convex. In 
addition, in order for adoption to take place in finite time, these conditions imply that 
adoption must be profitable:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0ρt
τ
ψ τ V τ e dt C τ I τ e
∞
−= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∫ rt >      (9) 
 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL  
We model the diffusion of drip irrigation technology using duration analysis following 
Karshenas and Stoneman, Kerr and Newell and Abdulai and Huffman. The duration model 
that will be developed below can be seen as the empirical counterpart of the arbitrage 
condition as defined in (7).  
Duration analysis builds on the so-called survival function, S(t), and hazard function, 
h(t). The survival function describes the probability of survival (in our case, survival of the 
old technology) beyond a certain point in time, t. The hazard function, h(t), describes the 
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probability of abandoning the old technology or the probability of adopting the new 
technology in the next “instant”, given that the old technology has survived up to time t.  
Let us assume that T is a positive random variable with a continuous probability 
distribution function (pdf), f(t). The cumulative distribution function is written 
( ) ( )
0
t
F t f ( s )ds P T t .= =∫ ≤         (10) 
We are interested in the probability ( )P T t>  which defines the survival function:11 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
1 1
t
t
S t F t f s ds f s ds.
∞
= − = − =∫ ∫       (11) 
The hazard function or hazard rate h(t) describes the rate at which individuals will 
adopt the technology in period t, conditional on not having adopted before t. Said differently, 
given that the old technology has survived until time t, the hazard rate will indicate how likely 
the farmer is to abandon it and adopt the new technology in the next interval Δ : t
( ΔP t T t t T t≤ ≤ + ≥ ) . The hazard function, h(t), corresponds to the limit of the latter 
probability when the time interval Δ :  0t →
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )Δ 0 Δ 0
Δ Δ
Δ Δ
P t T t T t F t F t f t
h t lim lim
S t S t→ →
⎛ ⎞≤ ≤ + ≥ ⎛ ⎞+ −= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
= .   (12) 
 
In empirical work, it is common to specify the hazard function as the product of two 
components: the baseline hazard, h0(t), which is assumed to be common to all individuals and 
to depend only on time, and a component which depends on adopters’ characteristics (zi) in an 
exponential manner (to ensure a positive hazard). The hazard function is thus written: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )0 exph t , ,β h t β= 'iz iz          (13) 
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 where zi is a set of explanatory variables and β  a vector of parameters to be estimated. The 
vector zi should include variables that are supposed to enter the arbitrage condition (7). These 
variables can either vary only across time (e.g., price of innovation), vary only across farmers 
(e.g., farm size, soil quality) or vary across both dimensions (e.g., farmer’s age).12  
The early literature on technology adoption has posed that the diffusion of technological 
innovations is the result of a process similar to the spread of a disease, with adoption rates 
depending on the interaction between adopters and potential adopters (Griliches; Mansfield). 
Karshenas and Stoneman assumed that these epidemic effects in diffusion are captured by the 
baseline hazard which is time dependent.13 
We choose to specify a parametric form for the baseline hazard .( )0h t 14 For the 
purposes of the present analysis we assume that the random variable T follows a Weibull 
distribution.15 The Weibull distribution is flexible in the sense that it accommodates hazard 
rates that increase or decrease exponentially with time. The hazard function under a Weibull 
distribution takes the following form: 
 
( ) 1α ih t , ,β αt λ−=iz  with ( )iλ exp β≡ 'iz      (14) 
 
where  is the shape parameter. The hazard rate either increases monotonically with time 
if , falls monotonically with time if 
0α >
1α > 1α < , or is constant if 1α = .16 The latter case 
indicates that there are no epidemic effects in the diffusion process.   
Under the assumption that T follows a Weibull distribution, the set of unknown 
parameters  can be estimated by maximum likelihood techniques. Since, at the time of (α,β )
the survey, not all farmers have adopted the modern technology, the likelihood has to account 
for right-censoring of some observations. The log-likelihood is written: 
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 ( ) ( ) (N N= + − − )
1 1
1 1i i
i i
Ln L(α,β ) d  ln f t , ,α,β d ln F t , ,α,β
= =
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∑ ∑i iz z  (15) 
or 
)    (16) 
 
where di = 1 if the ith spell is not censored and di = 0 if censored. In the context of the Weibull 
distribution, we have: 
( ) (
1 1
N N
i
i i
Ln L(α,β ) d  ln h t , ,α,β ln S t , ,α,β
= =
= +∑ ∑i iz z
 and ( ) ( )αi iS t , ,β exp λ t= −iz  with ( )iλ exp β≡ 'iz( ) 1αih t , ,β λ αt −=iz . 
The mean expected survival (i.e., adoption) time is calculated as: 
 
( )
1
1 1
α
1
i
E t Γ
λ α
= +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
       (17) 
 
with !  being the Gamma function, and the marginal effects of the explanatory 
variables on the hazard rate and on the mean expected survival time are calculated from: 
18) 
and 
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
( ) ( )1Γ n n= −
 
( ) ( )
kz k
h t , ,α,β h t , ,α,β β′ =i iz z       (
( ) ( )
k
k
z
βE t E t
α
′ = −         (19) 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND MODEL SP
he data used in this study come from a detailed survey undertaken in the Greek island of 
technologies. The survey was 
undertaken within the context of the Research Program FOODIMA financed by the European 
ECIFICATION 
T
Crete about the adoption and diffusion of drip irrigation 
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Commission under the 6th Framework Program.17 The final sample consists of 385 randomly 
selected olive producing farms located in the four major districts of Crete namely, Chania, 
Rethymno, Heraklio and Lasithi during the 2005-06 cropping period.18 Detailed information 
about production patterns, input use, average yields, gross revenues, and structural 
characteristics of the surveyed farms were obtained via questionnaire-based, field interviews. 
Farmers were asked the exact time of adoption of drip irrigation technologies during the last 
twelve years (i.e., 1994-2005). Also farmers were asked to recall data on some key variables 
including family size, irrigation water use, land tenancy, farm specialization and size, 
extension outlets, total debts and off-farm income.19 Summary statistics for these variables 
together with those gathered from secondary sources are reported in Table 1. From the total of 
385 farms in the sample, 250 (64.9%) have adopted drip irrigation technologies during the 
1994-2005 period. The intertemporal distribution of adoption times is presented in Figure 1. 
Our final choice of the variables to be included in the irrigation technology diffusion 
model is dictated by the arbitrage condition in (7) and by the definition of irrigation 
effectiveness in (4). The first decisive factor concerning individual adoption times as 
underlined by relation (7) is the cost of installation of drip irrigation equipment. This cost 
includes the cost of design for the new irrigation infrastructure, the cost of investment in the 
new equipment (i.e., pipes, hydrometers, drips) and the cost of installation on field. Table 1 
shows that installation cost per stremma (one stremma equals 0.1 ha) was on the average €130 
varying from a minimum of €98 to a maximum of €185 during the period analyzed (monetary 
values reported by individual farmers were deflated prior to estimation). The rate of change of 
the installation cost was found to be decreasing on average by 10.1% annually (in Figure 2 the 
price index of installation cost per stremma for drip irrigation exhibits a decreasing trend from 
1.8 in 1994 to 0.8 in 2005).   
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The second important component arising from the arbitrage condition in (7) concerns 
the informational incentives that may change producers’ perception about the profit-
effect
 the new 
techn
iveness of new irrigation technologies. Although fixed initial costs are incurred, 
informational incentives may be less costly than financial incentives in the long-run as 
information spreads throughout the rural communities. To understand what lies behind that, it 
is useful to make use of Rogers (1995, p.12) distinction between the hardware and the 
software aspects of new technologies. The hardware is the object that embodies the 
technology, while the software is the information needed to use it effectively. Although some 
of the software can be transmitted impersonally through retailers or user’s manuals, much of 
the software of a particular technology is built up based on the experience of using it. And 
without good software knowledge, many potential users of the new irrigation technologies 
will not adopt the new technology, although they are aware of its existence. In our empirical 
model, we proxy this software information spread, by the number of on-farm visits by 
extension personnel (private and public). In both developed and developing countries 
agriculture, much of software knowledge is transmitted through extension agents.20  
However, to pass on software knowledge, potential users need to be able to 
communicate directly with current users who have accumulated experience with
ology, besides the passage of information by extension agents. That is, software 
knowledge may often follow a word of mouth information diffusion process in which previous 
users are the main source of information. This means that the conditions for adoption of drip 
irrigation improve with the passage of time as cumulative rural experience on the new 
technology makes learning from others more effective. Hence the mass of information 
available to a potential adopter is a function not only of time and on-farm extension visits, but 
also of the density of adopters in the area or village at the time of deciding whether to adopt or 
not.  
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This raises an important concern about the intra-farm communication and the 
transmission of software knowledge. Obviously the flow of information between farmers is 
not h
variab
jective perceptions about future yields under both types of irrigation 
techn
omogeneous and therefore the stock of adopters in rural areas may not speed up the 
diffusion rate. Usually, farmers tend to exchange information and imitate farmers with whom 
they share common characteristics (religious beliefs, education, age, etc). Using Rogers’ 
terminology it is more likely that farmers imitate and gather information from their 
homophylic neighbors. When the population of farmers is heterophylic, differences between 
farmers can impede the process of communication or, more likely, the process of persuasion.   
In order to capture these distinct effects of information dissemination among rural 
communities, we introduce in the diffusion model two different variables: a village level 
le reflecting the cumulative extent of drip irrigation adoption within each village in the 
year prior to making a decision, and the stock of homophylic adopters in the village (see Table 
1b). Given our data availability, we define homophylic farmers based on education level, age 
and farm specialization. Farms were classified into four quartiles using these variables and 
homophylic farmers were defined as those belonging to the same quartile according to all 
variables. Finally, as implied by arbitrage condition in (7), we take into account changes in 
this information dissemination process through years, considering the rate of change in the 
stock of both homophylic and total adopters and on-farm extension visits in each year for 
every village.  
Next, the stochastic element in the optimal decision in (7) is not observable as it reflects 
individual sub
ology. However, according to the relevant literature, these perceptions may be 
realistically assumed to be influenced by the farmer’s economic and socio-demographic 
characteristics which are both observable. Following this line of reasoning, the expected gross 
benefits from adopting drip irrigation technology at time τ can be modeled as it is presented in 
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(14) with z being a matrix of farm’s socio-economic and demographic characteristics. Our 
choice for the elements of z is based on the availability and reliability of the relevant 
information arising from our sample survey. Based on the primary data collected we classify 
the factors affecting the diffusion of drip irrigation technology into three categories: farm, 
household and market characteristics. 
First, we expect more educated farmers to adopt profitable new technologies faster since 
the associated payoffs from innovations are likely to be greater (Rahm and Huffman). The 
expec
 is again ambiguous. Larger farms may have a greater potential to adopt 
modern
ted impact of age on the timing of adoption is ambiguous since age captures the effect 
of both experience and planning horizon. On the one hand, farming experience, which 
provides increased knowledge about the environment in which decisions are made, is 
expected to affect adoption positively. On the other hand, younger farmers with longer 
planning horizons may be more likely to invest in new technologies as they have to take into 
account future generations. Farmers in our sample received 7.72 years of formal education on 
average. The average age of the household head is 53.3 years, while family size is 3.78 
persons on average.  
The average farm size is 29.1 stremmas in our sample. The expected impact of farm 
size on adoption time
 irrigation technologies because of the high costs involved in irrigation. On the other 
hand, larger farms may have less financial pressure to search for alternative ways to improve 
their income by switching to a different technology (Perrin and Winkelmann; Putler and 
Zilberman). Also, the size of the farm is usually correlated with farmer’s risk aversion, which 
in turn may impact the time to adoption. If farmers owning larger [smaller] farms are less 
[more] risk-averse, then they may be more likely to adopt a new technology that is risk-
increasing [risk-decreasing]. The role of production risk and farmer’s risk aversion are taken 
into account through the inclusion of the first four conditional moments of farm profits in the 
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diffusion model (Kim and Chavas; Koundouri, Nauges and Tzouvelekas). The computation of 
the first four moments of farm profits is described in Appendix I, while Tables 1a and 1b 
show some basic statistics. 
Since property is an element of the institutional environment, we include in our model 
land tenancy as an explanatory variable of irrigation technology diffusion (Braverman and 
Stigli
 for technical assistance and thus for information gathering as 
their 
 technologies as the opportunity cost of time 
rises. 
tz). The potential effect of land tenure on diffusion is ambiguous. A positive relationship 
would be consistent with the hypothesis that greater leasing (or share-cropping) motivates 
farmers to work harder to meet their contractual obligations. On the other hand, a negative 
relationship would be consistent with agency theory, reflecting monitoring problems and 
adverse incentives between the parties involved that diminish business performance and hence 
profitable adoption decisions.  
The degree of farm specialization may also affect the timing of adoption. Specialized 
farms have fewer requirements
know-how is continually improved over time. On the other hand, farmers growing a 
single crop are faced with a higher risk of income loss in case of adverse events, which in turn 
may induce a lower probability of adoption if farmers are risk-averse. Farm’s specialization is 
measured by the Herfindhal index.21 In our sample, this index has an average value of 0.64, 
which indicates a high degree of specialization.  
Off-farm income is hypothesized to provide financial resources for information 
acquisition and to create incentives to adopt new
On the other hand, the level of off-farm income may not be exogenous but influenced 
by the profitability of farming itself, which in turn depends on adoption decisions. However, 
in our survey, off-farm income arises mainly from non-farm business activities (i.e., tourism) 
and from employment in other non-farm sectors (i.e., public administration, construction 
work). Given that the skill requirements are different for these jobs, farm and off-farm income 
 16
may be realistically assumed to be non-competitive. Thus, we can assume that the level of off-
farm income could be largely exogenous to adoption decisions (we statistically examine this 
assumption, see last paragraph of this section).  
Further, our diffusion model of drip irrigation technology incorporates farm’s distance 
from the market and total debts of the household. The village location and remoteness from 
the m
ct irrigation effectiveness. 
Given
arket is likely to be an important feature influencing the probability of adoption, while 
total debts are utilized to test Jensen’s (1986) hypothesis that increased financial obligations 
stimulate effort by producers to improve their performance in order to meet these obligations. 
In our sample, farms are located 26.22 km away from the major city in their area, whereas 
individual household debts are 1,587 euros on average (Table 1b).   
Finally, as relation (4) implies, adoption behavior for irrigation technology may also be 
influenced by the environmental characteristics of the farm that affe
 this, we include in the diffusion model an aridity index, the altitude of the farm and 
four soil dummies as a proxy for soil quality. The aridity index and the altitude of farm 
location reflect on-farm weather conditions, whereas the soil quality dummies reflect the 
water holding capacity of the soil. The aridity index is defined as the ratio of the average 
annual temperature over total annual precipitation (Stallings). It is calculated for the whole 
period analyzed using data provided by the 36 local meteorological stations located 
throughout the island. Since the value of the aridity index is identical for some farms that are 
located in the same area, we also include the altitude of farm’s location as an additional 
variable reflecting weather conditions. Higher altitude is more likely to be associated with 
adverse weather. As shown in the lower panel of Table 1a, the average value of the aridity 
index is 0.89, whereas the average altitude is 365 meters. Farms are classified according to 
four different soil types with respect to their water holding capacity. Sandy and limestone 
soils exhibit a lower holding capacity than marls and dolomites soils. The majority of farms in 
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the sample are cultivating olive-trees in marls (35.24%), followed by limestone (28.1%), 
sandy soils (19.72%), and dolomites (16.92%).   
To control for possible endogeneity of off-farm income, stock of adopters, stock of 
homophylic adopters, extension visits and debt, we implement a two-stage instrumental 
variab
TS AND SPECIFICATION TESTS 
The m mum likelihood parameter and standard error estimates of the hazard function are 
el is the natural logarithm of 
le procedure as suggested by Lee. In the first-stage we specify all the potential 
endogenous variables as functions of all other exogenous variables, plus a set of 
instruments.22 In the second-stage, the observed values of these variables are included along 
with the vector of their corresponding residuals, arising from the first-stage into the duration 
model. A simple t-test for the significance of the coefficients of the corresponding residuals is 
a test for the exogeneity of the suspicious variables (Smith and Blundell). Since we 
incorporate estimated values (i.e., profit moments) in the duration model, we use 
bootstrapping techniques to obtain consistent estimates of the corresponding standard errors 
(Politis and Romano).  
 
ESTIMATION RESUL
axi
shown in Table 2. The dependent variable in the diffusion mod
the “length of time” variable (measured in years) from first availability of the drip irrigation 
technology to when the farmer adopted it. In this framework, a negative coefficient estimate 
in the hazard function implies a negative marginal effect on duration time before adoption, 
that is, faster adoption. The overall fit of our model is satisfactory, since McFadden R2 
reaches 0.55. Several specification tests have been performed using the generalized 
likelihood-ratio (LR) test statistic (see Table 3).23  
We reject the null hypothesis of a constant baseline hazard model: the four district-
specific intercepts in the hazard function ( ( ) ( )1iz rr orh t , , t exp−= + 'izαβ α α β , where 1 4r , ,= …  
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stand
xcept for the district of Rethym le 2), and
n probabilities, 
condi
 to explain diffusion patterns across farms, i.e. if adoption of drip irrigation 
technology can be described by a sim
‘stock of adopters’, the stock 
of ho
ificant. A higher first moment, i.e., higher 
s for the four districts in the island, namely, Chania, Rethymno, Heraklio and, Lasithi) 
are all different from zero and positive, e no (Tab  
jointly different from zero (Table 3). This indicates that the rate at which farmers adopt the 
technology varies from one district to the other, all other things being equal.   
We reject the null hypothesis that the four district-specific intercepts are equal to one 
(H0:  α r = 1 ∀r ), which indicates positive duration dependence of adoptio
tional on the covariates (see Table 3), and hence the existence of epidemic effects in the 
diffusion process. The largest intercept is obtained for the district of Lasithi, where average 
annual rainfall is the lowest among all districts of the island, while the lowest intercept is 
obtained for Rethymno, which had the lowest average aridity index over the time period 
analyzed. The rate of adoption of more efficient irrigation technologies is thus found to be 
higher for farmers located in regions characterized by less favorable weather conditions (less 
rainfall).   
The next hypothesis we examine is whether the baseline hazard contains sufficient 
information
ple epidemic model of diffusion. The joint hypothesis 
that all farm-specific variables included in the hazard function are equal to zero is rejected, 
indicating that the adoption of drip irrigation technology by Cretan farmers cannot be 
explained by a process similar to the spread of a disease. 
Finally, three (out of five) residuals obtained from the first-stage instrumental variable 
regressions, are significant, indicating endogeneity of the overall 
mophylic adopters, and number of extension visits, thus providing support for our two-
stage instrumental variable estimation procedure.  
The effect of risk aversion is explicitly captured by the first four sample moments of 
profit, but only the first and third moments are sign
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expec
ducation and age 
on ado
 may suggest that the installation cost of the new 
technology is not a burden for small farms and that these farms adopt the new technology to 
ted profit, is found to increase the time to adoption, while a higher third moment, which 
captures downside risk, is found to reduce time to adoption.24 Hence, the length of adoption 
time will be shorter for farmers who are more sensitive to extreme events. This implies that 
one reason for the farmers in our sample to adopt drip irrigation technologies is to hedge 
against the risk of particularly bad outcomes. Moreover, a higher aridity index, a higher 
altitude and sandy soils are found to reduce time to adoption, significantly. Higher aridity and 
sandy soils both increase the water requirements of crops and thus increase the production 
risk related to adverse climatic conditions such as droughts (Koundouri, Nauges and 
Tzouvelekas). These results are consistent with the previous finding regarding risk aversion: 
farmers with a higher aridity index and sandy soils bear a higher risk of water shortage and 
hence are more likely to adopt a more efficient irrigation technology. In general, the role of 
risk aversion in explaining diffusion of modern irrigation technology is in line with the 
findings of Koundouri, Nauges and Tzouvelekas (who studied adoption of irrigation 
technologies under risk) using earlier data on farmers from the same region. 
The time to adoption of drip irrigation technologies is significantly shorter for farmers 
with higher level of education and for older farmers. The marginal effect of e
ption time is estimated at -1.93 and -0.75 years, respectively. These results indicate that 
knowledge and experience, as approximated by education and age, are important factors in 
inducing faster adoption of efficient irrigation technologies in this region. Moreover, the 
impact of extension services is found to be quite strong (the marginal effect is the highest: -
2.22 years), which confirms the hypothesis that information dissemination reduces time 
before adoption of the new technology. 
The estimated coefficient of farm size is positive, which indicates that time to adoption 
is longer for larger farms. This result
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cope a
. The negative coefficient of off-farm income is also as expected and confirms 
the as
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper we extend the traditional (theoretical) model of diffusion technology to account 
for production uncertainty and the value of information about the new technology, and apply 
sample of 385 farms located in Crete. 
gainst the risk of water shortage (which is likely to be higher for small farms). As 
expected, higher installation costs (and an increase in installation costs over time) induce an 
increase in the time to adoption. The marginal effect on adoption time is almost one year, 
while the coefficients of the four variables measuring imitation effects are significant. The 
negative signs of the two stocks variables confirm that the mass of adopters and the possibility 
of learning from others do matter in explaining diffusion of new technologies. The marginal 
effect of the stock of homophylic adopters on adoption time (-1.46 years) is about ten times 
the marginal effect of the total stock of adopters in the village (-0.14 years). This result 
indicates that farmers tend to learn more from and/or imitate farmers that are “more similar”, 
in our case this refers to farmers with common characteristics in terms of education level, age 
and farm specialization. The changes in the ‘stock of adopters’ has the opposite sign because, 
as time passes, more and more farmers have already adopted the new technology (i.e., the 
‘stock of farmers’ increases) but, at the same time, the number of new adopters each year 
decreases.  
The negative coefficient of the variable measuring total debt confirms Jensen’s 
hypothesis that increased financial obligations stimulate effort by producers to improve their 
performance
sumption that off-farm income creates incentives to adopt more efficient technologies as 
the opportunity cost of time rises. Finally, family size, land tenancy, farm specialization, and 
distance to the market are not found significant in this model. 
 
it to the case of irrigation technology diffusion, on a 
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Our results indicate that the role of risk aversion in explaining diffusion of modern irrigation 
technology is significant and the length of adoption time will be shorter for farmers who are 
more sensitive to downside risk. These findings are consistent with the result that farmers 
with a higher aridity index and sandy soils bear a higher risk of water shortage and hence are 
more likely to adopt the more efficient irrigation technology. In general, the role of risk 
aversion in explaining diffusion of modern irrigation technology is in line with the findings of 
Koundouri, Nauges and Tzouvelekas (who studied adoption of irrigation technologies under 
risk) using earlier data on farmers from the same region. Knowledge, experience and 
information dissemination are found to reduce time before adoption of the new technology, 
while farmers tend to learn more from and/or imitate farmers that are homophylic to them 
with respect to their education level, age and farm specialization.  
These results have significant policy implications with regards to creating incentives 
for technology adoption and regulating the pattern and timing of technology diffusion. First, 
the regulator must recognize that farmers face production uncertainty (mainly with respect to 
exogenous weather conditions), that farmers’ risk preferences will affect the timing of 
technology adoption and that new water-conservation irrigation technologies can be used as a 
means for production risk management. Hence these preferences must be uncovered and 
integrated in relevant water-related, agricultural and environmental management policies. 
Second, to increase the speed of technology adoption, the policy makers should invest in 
campaigns and educational programs that increase the knowledge and information 
dissemination with regards to the specific technology under investigation. Moreover, these 
campaigns will have higher feedback if directed to more experienced farmers. Finally, the 
regulator must recognize the importance of understanding the pattern of technology diffusion, 
which is significantly influenced by the similarity (with regards to education, age and farm 
specialization) between farmers. This implies that policies/campaigns that increase the 
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homogeneity of the farmers with regards to these characteristics will increase the speed of 
technology diffusion and as a result economize on the use of irrigation water. 
An interesting extension of this work is to attempt to introduce in the econometric 
model, and estimate, dynamic imitation effects. In particular, one could follow the theoretical 
results by Schlag, who identifies a uniquely optimal individual rule for the imitation process 
(both for the social planner and the boundedly rational individual), which describes how to 
choose future actions. If this rule is empirically translated and incorporated in the estimated 
model it can inform the time-series dimension of technology diffusion and allow further 
refinement of technology adoption policy. Such an extension would require panel data.      
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APPENDIX: COMPUTATION OF THE FOUR SAMPLE MOMENTS 
The first four moments of the profit distribution are derived following a sequential estimation 
procedure. In the first step, profit is regressed on the contemporaneous input variables to 
provide an estimate of the “mean” effect. The model has the following general form: 
 
( )i ;= ix γϖ ϕ iu+         (A.1) 
 
where  denotes individual farmers in the sample, 1i , N= … ϖ  is the profit per hectare, x is the 
vector of variable inputs, and extra shifters reflecting farm characteristics and, ui is the usual 
iid error term. Specifically, vector x includes capital stock measured in euros, irrigation water 
use measured in m3, cultivated area measured in stremmas, intermediate inputs (i.e., chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides) measured in euros, farmer’s education level measured in years, the 
aridity index as a proxy of environmental conditions and on-farm extension visits.  
Under expected profit maximization the explanatory variables are assumed to be 
exogenous and thus the OLS estimation of (A.1) provides consistent and efficient estimates of 
the parameter vector γ. Then, the jth central moment of profit ( )2j , ,m= …  conditional on 
input use and farm characteristics is defined as: 
 
( ) ( ){ }1 jj E .μ ϖ μ⎡= −⎣. ⎤⎦        (A.2) 
 
where μ1 represents the mean or first moment of profit. Thus, the estimated errors from the 
mean effect regression  ( )u ϖ ϕ⎡ = −⎣ x; ⎤⎦γ  are estimates of the first moment of the profit 
distribution. The estimated errors u  are then squared and regressed on the same set of 
explanatory variables: 
 28
 l ( )2iu g ;= ix δ iu+        (A.3) 
 
The application of OLS on (A.3) provides consistent estimates of the parameter vector 
 and the predicted values  are consistent estimates of the second central moment of the 
profit distribution (i.e., the variance). We follow the same procedure to estimate the third and 
fourth central moments, by using the estimated errors raised to the power of three and four, 
respectively, as dependent variables in the estimated models.  
δ lm2iu
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Figure 1.  Diffusion of Drip Irrigation in Crete, Greece. 
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Figure 2.  Cost of Installation Equipment for Drip Irrigation. 
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Table 1a. Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables: household, farm 
characteristics and environmental conditions. 
Variable Name Mean St Dev 
Duration length (years) Time 5.63 4.89 
Household Characteristics:   
Education (years of schooling) Edu 7.72 3.41 
Age (years) Age 53.3 13.1 
Family size (no of persons) Fam 3.78 1.43 
Farm Characteristics:   
Irrigation water use (m3) Water 30.83 15.12 
Land tenancy (% of rented land) Ten 0.29 0.21 
Capital Stock (€) Cap 3,147.34 1,514.12 
Specialization (Herfindhal index) Spec 0.64 0.13 
Farm output (kg) Out 18,547 4,521.04 
Intermediate inputs (€) Intm 2,058 987.17 
Farm size (stremmasa) Size 29.12 14.52 
1st profit Moment Mom1 2.03 0.81 
2nd profit Moment Mom2 0.72 0.33 
3rd profit Moment Mom3 0.89 0.61 
4th profit Moment Mom4 2.10 1.14 
Environmental Conditions:   
Aridity index Ard 0.89 0.34 
Altitude (meters) Alt  365.42 231.43 
Soil Type (% of farm Land):   
Sandy San 19.72  
Limestone Lim 28.12  
Marls Mar 35.24  
Dolomites Dol 16.92  
Districts (no of farms):   
Chania Cha 79  
Rethymno Rth 41  
Heraklio Her 84  
Lasithi Las 46  
a one stremma equals 0.1 ha. 
Table 1b. Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables: information and market 
characteristics. 
Variable Name Mean StDev
Information:   
Extension services (no of visits) Ext 18.12 15.78
Rate of change in extension (%) ΔExt 1.17 0.23
Market Characteristics:   
Installation cost (€ per stremmaa) Cost 130.15 21.37
Rate of change in installation cost (%) ΔCost -10.12 1.32
Stock of adopters (no of farms) Stock 132.67 90.09
Rate of change in stock of adopters (%) ΔStock 20.76 10.21
Stock of homophylic adopters (no of farms) HStock 13.45 5.23
Rate of change in the stock of homophylic adopters (%) ΔHStock 3.09 2.11
Interest rate (%) r 8.12 1.11
Distance from the market (km) Dist 26.22 12.34
Total debts (€) Dbt 1,587.11 942.36
Off-farm income (€ per year) Off 987.34 678.93
Extension outlets (no of outlets) ExtOut 4.62 2.87
Distance from extension outlets (km) ExtDist 37.12 21.58
Tourist arrivals (thousands of persons) Tour 432.12 157.01
Distance from district capital (km) Distc 42.36 14.48
a one stremma equals 0.1 ha. 
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Table 2.  Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates of Hazard Function for Adoption of 
Drip Irrigation Technology.  
 
Variable Estimate Std Error Variable Estimate Std Error 
αCha 2.0158 (0.6587)* βExt -0.5141 (0.1147)* 
αRth 0.9857 (0.8356) βΔExt 0.1458 (0.0705)** 
αHer 1.1241 (0.4541)* βDist 0.1105 (0.1359) 
αLas 2.3651 (0.6025)* βSize 0.0751 (0.0329)** 
βCost 0.4025 (0.1025)* βWater -0.5085 (0.1698)* 
βΔcost 0.0141 (0.0066)** βTen -0.0066 (0.0091) 
βStock -0.0385 (0.0195)** βSpec 0.1425 (0.1014) 
βΔstock 0.0068 (0.0036)** βDbt -0.0958 (0.0447)** 
βHstock -0.4021 (0.2001)** βOff -0.0135 (0.0068)** 
βHΔStock 0.0958 (0.0412)** βArd -0.1412 (0.0692)** 
βEdu -0.4528 (0.1458) * βAlt -0.0662 (0.0344)** 
βFam 0.0098 (0.0103) βSan -0.1304 (0.0625)** 
βMom1 0.0745 (0.0403)** βLim -0.0854 (0.1147) 
βMom2 0.0421 (0.0621) βMar 0.0625 (0.0847) 
βMom3 -0.0748 (0.0321)** βAge -0.1745 (0.0925)** 
βMom4 -0.0085 (0.0097)    
βOff_Res 0.0055 (0.0092) βExt_Res 0.0517 (0.0142)* 
βStock_Res -0.0147 (0.0041)* βDbt_Res -0.0589 (0.0747) 
βHStock_Res 0.0417 (0.0112)*    
Ln(θ) -304.187 No of observations 385 
McFadden R2 0.5547 No of adopters 250 
* (**) indicate significance at the 1 (5) per cent level. Standard errors were obtained using block re-sampling 
techniques which entails grouping the data randomly in a number of blocks of farms and re-estimating the model 
leaving out each time one of the blocks of observations and then computing the corresponding standard errors 
(Politis and Romano). For variable definitions see Tables 1a and 1b.  
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Table 3. Model Specification Tests.  
 
Null hypothesis Parameter Restrictions LR-test Critical value 
(α=0.05) 
1. Constant baseline hazard α r = 0 ∀r  244.87 24 9.49χ =  
2. No epidemic effects  α r = 1 ∀r  35.89 24 9.49χ =  
3. Epidemic model of diffusion 0   k kβ = ∀  385.44 232 44.01χ   
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Table 4. Marginal Effects of the Explanatory Variables on the Hazard Rate and Mean 
Expected Adoption Time of Drip Irrigation Adoption (indicate percentage change 
in the hazard rate).  
 
Variable Hazard Rate Adoption Time 
Installation cost  -17.14 0.95 
Change in installation cost -0.69 0.05 
Stock of adopters  3.12 -0.14 
Change in stock of adopters -0.49 0.03 
Stock of homophylic adopters 20.15 -1.46 
Change in stock of homophylic adopters -4.87 0.35 
Education  26.15 -1.93 
Family size  -0.38 0.02 
1st Profit moment -0.023 0.011 
2nd Profit moment -0.010 0.007 
3rd Profit moment 0.019 -0.008 
4th Profit moment 0.001 0.000 
Extension services  34.19 -2.22 
Change in extension services -5.08 0.36 
Distance from the market  -5.17 0.32 
Farm size  -4.42 0.28 
Irrigation water use  28.19 -2.03 
Land tenancy  0.38 -0.04 
Specialization -5.23 0.41 
Total debts  5.58 -0.33 
Off-farm income  0.92 -0.04 
Aridity Index  9.53 -0.53 
Altitude  3.82 -0.22 
Sandy soils 0.08 -0.06 
Limestone soils 0.02 -0.01 
Marble soils  -0.01 0.001 
Age  9.17 -0.75 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1  Dixit and Pindyck argue that favorable but irreversible technology adoption decisions 
require positive net present values to reflect the opportunity cost to the farm of keeping its 
investment options open in the future.  
2 Hannon and McDowell and David provide empirical evidence on the important role of 
institutions in technology diffusion.  
3 Empirical agronomic evidence suggests that irrigation technologies may well affect the use 
of other variable inputs in crop production such as fertilizers or labor (for instance when 
fertilization is applied through drip irrigation system). Therefore the irrigation technology 
index may be directly included in the production function. In order to keep our empirical 
analysis tractable, we assume irrigation technologies to be the only source of farm innovation.  
4 Sherlund, Barrett and Adesima showed that neglecting “environmental factors” leads to 
omitted variable bias in the estimated parameters of the production function and hence, on 
conventional factors’ marginal productivities.  
5 According to Schoengold and Zilberman applied water is the total amount of water that is 
used by the farmer on the field, while effective water is the amount of water actually used by 
the crop.  
6 Soil is a dynamic system which acts as a reservoir and buffer against plant dehydration. 
Whether enough water is stored for the plant to avoid water deficiency and stress depends on 
several soil characteristics such as its slope, salinity, and water retention. The combination of 
these characteristics provide an index of the soil water holding capacity. 
7 In traditional irrigation technologies like furrow, large quantities of water are applied in a 
short period of time. Water is spread from the distribution pipes across fields using gravity 
forces that often result in a non-uniform application. On the other hand, capital intensive 
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( )S t−
modern irrigation technologies like drip apply less amount of water over longer time periods, 
while both capital equipment and pressure ensure a uniform distribution throughout the plot. 
8 In a similar context Rosenberg and Tsur, Sternberg, Hochman model the diffusion process 
as a result of a dynamic optimization procedure under the assumption that decision makers 
have perfect foresight regarding the effects of present decisions on future events.   
9 Since farmers do not have any kind of market power producing a variety of crops, their 
adoption decision rarely influences the output price.  
10 For example drip irrigation technology may involve higher pressurization cost. On the other 
hand, since farmers are assumed to be price takers in both output and input markets, the 
marginal cost of all other factors of production is not affected by their choice of irrigation 
technology.  
11 For an individual farm, 1  gives the probability that the farmer will have adopted the 
innovation by time t, but if one considers the whole population of farmers, all of whom are 
present at the date of innovation, it will also represent the expected diffusion of the innovation 
through that population of farmers, that is, the share of farmers that has adopted the 
innovation. 
12 Time-varying variables can follow either a continuous time path (e.g., farmer’s age) or be 
step-functions over time (e.g. price of innovation). 
13 Karshenas and Stoneman also introduced a multiplicative epidemic baseline hazard 
function. However, recognizing that it is not econometrically possible to identify separately 
these functions, they implicitly assumed that the epidemic hazard is absorbed into the baseline 
hazard. 
(14 The choice of a specific structure for )0h t  is subject to the peculiarities of each case study. 
The baseline hazard can be either semi-parametric, as in the Cox proportional hazard model 
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1α = 2=
k →∞
where explanatory variables shift the baseline hazard function, or parametric according to 
which a specific functional form defines the baseline hazard for all individuals over the whole 
period. Semi-parametric models are more flexible as no distributional assumption is required 
about the shape of the hazard function. However, they ignore what happens to explanatory 
variables in periods where no adoption occurs. On the other hand, parametric models are more 
efficient in their use of information provided by the data. The most widely used parametric 
specifications include the logistic, Weibull, exponential, log-normal, log-logistic and 
Gompertz probability distributions. More details on these particular probability distributions 
functions within duration analysis are provided by Kiefer. 
15 Although Karshenas and Stoneman suggested that the choice of a baseline hazard structure 
seems to make little difference as far as parameter estimates and inferences are concerned, the 
appropriateness of our choice will be validated next.  
16 For  the Weibull distribution reduces to the exponential distribution. For α , the 
Weibull distribution becomes the Rayleigh distribution which has linearly increasing hazard 
rate as t increases. For 3.4 the Weibull distribution resembles closely the normal distribution 
whereas for , the Weibull distribution asymptotically approaches the Dirac delta 
function. 
17 The FOODIMA project (EU Food Industry Dynamics and Methodological Advances) is 
financed within the 6th Framework Programme under Priority 8.1-B.1.1 for the Sustainable 
Management of Europe’s Natural Resources. More information on the FOODIMA project can 
be found in www.eng.auth.gr/mattas/foodima.htm. 
18 Using the Agricultural Census published by the Greek Statistical Service, farms were 
classified according to their size and activities. Then with the help of extension agents from 
the Regional Agricultural Directorate of Crete a randomly sample of farms was selected. In 
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the case that farmers were not available or not willing to provide the required information, 
they were replaced by similar ones from the same area.   
19 Running a pilot survey we found that nobody had adopted drip irrigation technologies 
before 1994. So in the final survey, interviewers were asking recall data only for that period.  
20 In a traditional sense, agricultural extension is a mechanism by which information on new 
technologies, and better farming practices can be transmitted to farmers (Owens, Hoddinott 
and Kinsey). 
21 The Herfindhal index was calculated as ∑  where  is the share of crop i in total 
farm production. 
is
22 For the off-farm income equation, the set of instruments includes the distance from district 
capital in kilometers and the number of tourist arrivals in the island. For the stock of adopters 
and homophylic adopters we include the farm population in the area and the share of farms 
cultivating olive-trees. For on-farm extension visits, we use the number of extension outlets 
(public and private) in the area and the distance of the farm to the extension outlets in 
kilometers. Finally, for household debts, the instruments were capital stock and a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether farms use mechanical harvesting equipment or not. 
23 The LR test statistic is computed as: ( ) ( ){ }0 12LR ln L H ln L H= − − ( )0L H
( )1
 where  and 
L H  denote the values of the likelihood function under the null ( )0H
( )1H
 and the alternative 
 hypothesis, respectively. The LR-test follows approximately a χ2 distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions. 
24 Downside risk aversion means that when there is a choice between two output distributions 
with the same mean and variance, the output distribution which is less skewed to the left is 
preferred. 
